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THE LITTLE RED SCHOOLHOUSE: PIERCE, 
STATE MONOPOLY OF EDUCATION AND 
THE POLITICS OF INTOLERANCE 
Paula Abrams* 
If the Oregon School Law is held to be unconstitutional it is 
not only a possibility but almost a certainty that within a few 
years the great centers of population in our country will be 
dotted with elementary schools which instead of being red on 
the outside will be red on the inside. 
-Brief of Appellant, Governor of State of Oregon, in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters1 
It need, therefore, not excite our wonder that today no 
country holds parenthood in so slight esteem as did Plato or 
the Spartans-except Soviet Russia. There children do belong 
to the state; ... In final analysis, it is submitted, the enactment 
in suit is in consonance only with the communistic and bol-
shevistic ideals now obtaining in Russia, and not with those of 
free government and American conceptions of liberty. 
- Brief of Appellee, The Society of the Sisters of the Holy 
Names of Jesus and Mary, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters? 
In the aftermath of World War I, the specter of communism 
cast shadows deep into the American psyche. Nativist senti-
ments, spiked during World War I, combined with fears of leftist 
revolution to create a culture hostile both to immigrants and to 
ideas perceived as anti-American.3 From 1919 to1929, Attorney 
* Copyright © 2003 Paula Abrams. Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law 
School. I wish to thank the participants in the Lewis & Clark Law School Faculty Collo-
quium for their insightful comments. I am indebted to St. Mary's Academy, Portland, 
Oregon, for providing generous access to their archives. Thanks also to Rayna Brachman 
for her excellent research assistance. 
1. Brief of Appellant, The Governor of the State of Oregon, Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, COMPLETE RECORD 
102-03 (Belvedere Press, 1925). 
2. Brief on Behalf of Appellee, The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary, in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 275. 
3. David Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 581 
61 
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General A. Mitchell Palmer and his young assistant, J. Edgar 
Hoover, led a campaign to deport immigrant members of the 
Communist Party.4 The drive to assimilate immigrants became a 
patriotic mission to protect national security.5 Public education 
presented a powerful mechanism of assimilation, training im-
pressionable children to become good American citizens.6 By 
1919, thirty-seven states enacted laws restricting the teaching of 
foreign languages.7 Questions of patriotism, loyalty, and the 
meaning of American citizenship dominated public discourse.8 
Threats to national security also preoccupied the Supreme 
Court, which upheld the conviction of immigrants, antiwar activ-
ists, and socialists for subversive speech under the Espionage 
and Sedition Acts.9 The speech cases were representative of the 
(1981); Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REv. 932 (1919). 
4. The Evil That Lurks in the Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, §4, at 14. 
Look Magazine published an article on "How to Spot a Communist." Id. 
5. See e.g., Harding and Hughes Ask Patriotic Help at D.A.R. Convention, N.Y. 
TIMES, April 17, 1923, at 1. Between 1901 and 1920, over 14 million immigrants came to 
America, the large majority of them from southern and eastern Europe, most of them 
Catholics and Jews. LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 381 (Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 1st ed., 2001). For a discussion between the tensions of pluralism and assimila-
tion, see id. at 377-408. 
6. The common school movement originating in the nineteenth century yielded a 
well-developed system of universal free public education. See DAVID TY ACK ET AL., 
LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, at 20-42 (1987). In 1920, the 
sociologist John Daniels described the virtues of public education as children who "go 
into the kindergarten as little Poles or Italians or Finns, babbling in the tongues of their 
parents, and at the end of half a dozen years or more he sees them emerge, looking, talk-
ing, thinking, and behaving generally like full-fledged Americans." JOHN DANIELS, 
AMERICA VIA THE NEIGHBORHOOD 249-50 (Harper & Bros., 1920). 
7. Brief in Behalf of Appellee, The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary at App. II, supra note 1, at 767. 
8. One publication, AMERICA VIA THE NEIGHBORHOOD, analyzed the process of 
"Americanization of the immigrant" through community institutions, including the public 
schools. DANIELS, supra note 6; see also Try a New Method With Foreigners, Why Not Let 
Them Americanize Themselves? N.Y. TIMES Aug. 24, 1919, at 32; Meet to Formulate 
Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 1920, at 21; Harding Proposes Immigration Curb, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 15, 1920, at 3; Would Have Nation Teach Citizenship, Secretary Davis 
Urges Federal System to Educate Aliens for Naturalization, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1922, at 23. 
9. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (aflirming a conviction while acknowl-
edging that had the same words been uttered, and actions taken place during a time of peace 
rather than war, Schenck would have been acting within his constitutional rights); Frohwerk v. 
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct military 
recruiting by publishing and distributing anti-war materials); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211 (1919) (upholding the conviction of Debs, the leader of the Socialist movement in the 
United States and a former presidential candidate who garnered over a million votes in the 
1912 election, based on a speech Debs gave expressing opposition to the war); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conspiracy convictions based on distribution of 
leallets to workers in ammunition factories. The Court determined that defendants urged cur-
tailment of the production of war material with the intent to cripple or hinder the nation's war 
efforts); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,670 (1925) (upholding the conviction of Gitlow, a 
communist and former New York legislator, based on a state law that "utterances of a certain 
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Court's larger concern with articulating the appropriate relation-
ship between individual and state in a world of vast and rapid 
technological and social change. These changes, coupled with the 
massive political, economic, and social upheavals rendered by 
World War I, pressed the Court continually to address the 
proper balance between state control and individuality in a con-
stitutional democracy. The Court's persistent protection of eco-
nomic liberties during the 1920s reflected its assessment of the 
limits of governmental regulation in a democratic society. 10 
This focus on defining the limits of government power in a 
constitutional democracy illuminates Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 11 
one of only two substantive due process cases from the Lochner 
era based on personal rather than economic liberties.12 Pierce 
struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend pub-
lic schools. The Oregon ballot initiative was largely the product 
of anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant sentiments. 13 The Court 
found the law unconstitutional because it "unreasonably inter-
fere[ d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control. "14 In 
the opinion's most quoted passage, the Court concluded: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in 
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to stan-
dardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from pub-
lic teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, cou-
kind involve such danger of substantive evil that they be punished"). 
10. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 545 (1923), quoting ap-
provingly from Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) ("In all such particulars the em-
ployer and the employee have equality of right and any legislation that disturbs that 
equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract which no government can 
legally justify in a free land."); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 513 (1924) 
("(A] State may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with 
private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary 
restrictions upon them."); Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402, 415 (1926) ("The 
constitutional guaranties may not be made to yield to mere convenience. The business 
here involved is legitimate and useful; and, while it is subject to all reasonable regulation, 
the absolute prohibition of the use of [materials in the manufacture of quilts] is purely 
arbitrary and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also 
Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court Era, 
78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1533 (1998). 
11. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
12. The other case is Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) decided two years 
before Pierce. See infra text accompanying note 68. 
13. See infra text accompanying note 25. 
14. 268 U.S at 534-35. 
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pled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations. 15 
The language employed by the Court was no accident. It spoke 
clearly to the theme of the limits on governmental power in democ-
racy, and particularly to the question of whether a state monopoly 
of education can exist in a democracy. The language invites a com-
parison of democracy and autocracy, a competition persistently 
characterized by both sides of the dispute as the heart of the case. 
Pierce invites numerous analytical adventures. It has been heralded 
as a triumph of pluralism over nativism and bigotry, 16 a victory for 
religious freedom,17 and the foundational case for the right of pri-
vacy.18 It is all of these. But it also has been perceived as something 
of an anomaly, a somewhat unexplainable departure into previ-
ously unarticulated parental rights amidst the jurisprudence of a 
Court firmly committed to seeing the world through the narrow 
lens of economic liberties.19 Even more puzzling in this respect is 
that Pierce offered the Court the opportunity to decide the case on 
economic grounds, which the Court declined.20 Instead, the Court, 
faced with the question of state monopoly of education, drew from 
the larger political controversy about communism the opportunity 
to make a statement about the limits of government power over 
education that transcended economic concerns. The Court's analy-
sis of the compatibility of state monopoly of education with democ-
racy shapes the decision far more than the minimal effort it ex-
pended in carving the constitutional contours of parental rights. 
Highlighting the Pierce Court's preoccupation with state 
power does not ignore the fact that power and rights are two 
sides of the same coin. But doing so may help to shed light on 
the case, particularly in understanding the Court's failure to ar-
ticulate the scope of parental rights. Pierce, a case cited exten-
sively but rarely discussed in modern substantive due process 
15. /d. at 535. 
16. See e.g., Martha Minow, Before and After Pierce, A Colloquium on Parents, 
Children, Re!Lgion and Schools, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2001). 
17. Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 
Years Later, 27 SETO!'< HALL L. REV. 1194 (1997). 
18. Jeb Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737,743 (1989). 
19. See e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial 
Restraint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 601 (2002); Lois 
Shepard, Looking Forward with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 258-59 
(2001 ). 
20. See Brief of Appellant Pierce, supra note 1, at 89-94; Supplement to Brief of 
Appellant Pierce, supra note 1, at 123-26; Brief of Appellant Va~ Winkle, supra note 1, 
at 154-57; Brief of Appellee Society of Sisters, supra note 1, at 248-54, 290-92, 304-07, 
318-21, 330-36,347-58. 
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cases, dominated the analysis in Troxel v. Granville,21 the 2000 
Supreme Court case dealing with grandparent visitation. In 
Troxel, the Court relied upon the parental rights established in 
Pierce to hold that a court order compelling visitation between 
children and their grandparents violated the mother's due proc-
ess rights to control the upbringing of her children.22 The lack of 
consensus on the Troxel Court as to the scope of the right pro-
tected by Pierce and the standard of review to be applied is bet-
ter understood in the context of the minimalist treatment ac-
corded parental rights in Pierce. Pierce's abbreviated discussion 
of parental rights makes sense when it becomes clear that state 
monopoly of education, not parental rights, absorbed the Court. 
In a political era dominated by the perceived polarities of com-
munism and democracy, communism provided the Court a con-
venient barometer for assessing constitutional democracy. From 
a broader constitutional perspective, Pierce illuminates the sub-
stantive due process cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.23 At the heart of these cases also lies the question of the ex-
tent of government power in a constitutional democracy. 
This article examines Pierce in its historical context. Its the-
sis is that the parental rights protected in Pierce augment an 
opinion focused primarily on whether state monopoly of educa-
tion is permissible in a democracy. While Pierce is legitimately 
viewed as a seminal case for the constitutional protection of pa-
rental rights, the case provides far greater insight into fundamen-
tal attributes of democracy. Part I analyzes the political and legal 
history of the case in Oregon, exploring the anti-Bolshevik and 
nativist sentiments underlying the case. Part II examines Pierce 
and relevant precedent as presented to the Supreme Court, high-
lighting the debate about democracy central to the case. Part III 
traces the relationship between the state, parental authority, and 
education. This section analyzes both the general importance of 
education to democracy and the particular significance of "citi-
zenship" education in the political climate after World War I. It 
21. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The Court relied upon Pierce in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1%5) as foundational precedent to the right of privacy. Numerous substantive 
due process cases have cited Pierce to support the Court's protection of liberty interests un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment. See e.g., Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 
685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 
(1996); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992); Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 
434 U.S. 374,385 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977). 
22. 530 U.S. at 65-66. 
23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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places Pierce in the context of the broader legal and political de-
bate over the perceived threat from communism. Part IV evalu-
ates Pierce as precedent, from its Lochner era origins through 
the recent case of Troxel v. Granville. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE OREGON SCHOOL BILL CASE 
A. THE CAMPAIGN ON THE INITIATIVE 
On November 7, 1922, the people of Oregon approved a 
ballot initiative mandating compulsory public education for chil-
dren between the ages of eight and eighteen.24 Its passage was 
sparked by a synergy of interests representative of the country's 
mood following World War I. Oregon, largely white, native, and 
Protestant, responded to nativist arguments that immigrants and 
non-Protestants, particularly Catholics, threatened the political 
and cultural security of the country.25 Politically populist and 
progressive in orientation, Oregonians perceived the public 
school as the fundamental tool of assimilation.26 In 1919, Oregon 
became one of twenty-eight states to pass laws prohibiting 
schools from teaching in any language other than English.27 Ore-
gon also passed laws in the early 1920s prohibiting the publica-
tion of newspapers in language other than English28 and forbid-
ding public school teachers from wearing religious garb.29 
24. The law provided exceptions for physical disability, distance from school, those 
who had completed the eighth grade, or those allowed by the county superintendent to 
have private tutoring. 1923 Or. Laws§ 5259 (a-d), in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 
1, at 9-10. 
25. In 1920 only 13% of Oregonians were foreign-born. Ninety-three percent of the 
children in school were already in public school. David P. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: 
The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74,75-76 (1968). 
26. WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS, NATIVISM, EDUCATION AND 
THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 150 (University of Nebraska Press, 1994). Chief Justice 
Taft, speaking at a Bar meeting in the Northwest commented, "[t]he State of Oregon served 
a useful function in the life of the nation, as a sort of laboratory for trying out new and dan-
gerous experiments in the political and social world, since her remoteness from the centers 
of population in the older portion of the Union enabled her to conduct such exploits with-
out serious hazard to the rest of the country." LAWRENCE SAALFELD, F:>RCES OF 
PREJUDICE IN OREGON, 1920-1925, at 63 (1984) (originally appearing in Dudley G. 
Wooten, REMEMBER OREGON 3 (1923)). The assimilation advocated was comprehensive-
cultural, political, and class. The Voter's Pamphlet argument in favor of the measure 
stressed the need to "[m]ix the children of the foreign-born with the native-born, and the 
rich with the poor." Reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 732. 
27. Brief on Behalf of Appellee, The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary at App. II, supra note 2, at 928-30. 
28. Chapter 17, GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON, 1920. 
29. Brief on Behalf of Appellee, The Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus and Mary at App. II, supra note 2 at 882. 
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The Ku Klux Klan fueled nativist fires in Oregon. The Klan's 
success in appealing to Oregonians as "the soul of Americanism" 
and "the spirit of Protestantism" yielded between fourteen and 
twenty thousand new members by the 1920s.30 Immigrants and 
Catholics were the primary targets of the Klan outside the South, 
and it is not surprising that the Klan's hands were all over the Ore-
gon public school initiative?1 Compulsory public education was a 
key strategic issue for the Klan, whose members were sworn to up-
hold public education as the true protector of American values.32 
Walter M. Pierce, the Democratic candidate for governor in 1922, 
won the election after he succumbed to Klan pressure to support 
the public school initiative and received the Klan's endorsement.33 
In the campaign for the initiative and in the subsequent legal 
challenges, nativist sentiments merged with postwar politics. What-
ever was foreign was anti-American. Sectarianism equaled lack of 
patriotism. And with Bolshevism and communism perceived as the 
great threats to democracy, immigrants and non-Protestants were 
linked with subversive politics?4 The menace to American democ-
racy presented a justification far more politically acceptable than 
explicit intolerance for religious and ethnic pluralism, particularly 
since this theme not only capitalized on widespread postwar anxie-
ties, but also appealed to those progressives who believed that uni-
versal common schooling provided the class-leveling essential to 
democracy?5 The official Voter Pamphlet's argument in favor of 
30. Comments of Imperial Wizard Hiram Wesley Evans. David A. Horowitz, Social 
Morality and Personal Revitalization: Oregon's Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s, OR. HIST. Q., 
Winter 1989, at 367, 369. The population of Oregon at that time was approximately 
750,000 people. The Klan's power in Oregon was the subject of a Proclamation by the 
Governor, Ben Olcott, in May 1922, announcing that "[d]angerous forces are insidiously 
gaining a foothold in Oregon" and calling upon all law enforcement officers to "insist 
that unlawfully disguised men be kept from the streets." THE OREGON SCHOOL FIGHT: 
A TRUE AND COMPLETE HISTORY 21-22 (A.B. McCain ed., 1924). , 
31. While the origins of the campaign for the initiative can be traced to a 1920 resolu-
tion by the Scottish Rite Masons, there is evidence the Klan had infiltrated the Masons and 
that two of the original sponsors of the initiative were Klan officials. The Klan subsequently 
became an aggressive public supporter of the initiative. Tyack, supra note 25, at 77. Many 
Masons actually ended up opposing the measure. Ross, supra note 26, at 152. 
32. Klan members swore that "I believe that our Free Public School is the corner-
stone of good government, and that those who are seeking to destroy it are enemies of 
our Republic and are unworthy of citizenship." Tyack, supra note 25, at 79. Compulsory 
public education also was the highest priority of the Klan in Michigan, where a compul-
sory public education amendment to the state constitution failed in 1920. Ross, supra 
note 26, at 140-43. 
33. Ross, supra note 26, at 151. 
34. The perceived threat of papal influence, which fueled anti-Catholic sentiment, 
was also deemed politically subversive. Tyack, supra note 25, at 85. 
35. Walter Pierce's support for the initiative was at least partially due to his view of 
the public schools as a positive egalitarian influence. Ross, supra note 26, at 151; Barbara 
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the initiative, named the "Compulsory Education Bill" by its spon-
sors, asserted that the public school exists for the "sole purpose of 
self-preservation" and insisted that "[w]e must now halt those com-
ing to our country from forming groups, establishing schools, and 
thereby bringing up their children in an environment often antago-
nistic to the principles of our government."36 Newspaper ads in 
support of the initiative described the public school as a "democ-
ratic baptism" and as the "only" truly American school, its mission 
"citizenship."37 The ads urged voters to consider support for the 
school bill the litmus test of patriotism.38 Prorsonents of the bill la-
beled supporters of private schools "traitors." 9 The Klan campaign 
played heavily on anti-Catholic sentiments, accusing Catholics of 
trying to destroy public education.40 But the Klan also rang the pa-
triotism bell, with its "100% Americanism" campaign, character-
ized by the slogan "One Flag-One School-One Language."41 The 
Klan, the Scottish Rite Masons, and the Oregon Federation of Pa-
triotic Societies sponsored the majority of organized support on 
behalf of the school measure.42 
By contrast, the campaign against the initiative brought to-
gether a diverse group of religious and secular organizations. 
Catholic, Protestant (primarily Lutheran), and Jewish groups 
joined business and civil rights groups. 43 Concerned that charges 
of bigotry would only inflame nativist and anti-Catholic senti-
Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1033 (1992). 
36. Official Pamphlet, Argument (Affirmative), reprinted in OREGON SCHOOL 
CASES, supra note 1, at 732. The designation of the initiative as a "compulsory education 
bill" may have led to some voter confusion because Oregon already had a compulsory 
education law, § 5259 of the Oregon Laws. Ross, supra, note 26, at 153-54. 
37. Free Public Schools, America's Noblest Monument, OREGONIAN, Nov. 5, 1922. 
38. /d. The ad described a politician who did not support the school bill as a "traitor 
to the spirit of the United States." 
39. Speaker for School Bill, OR. STATESMAN, Nov. 3, 1922 
40. SAALFELD, supra note 26, at 71; Tyack, supra note 25, at 85; Ross, supra note 26, 
at 154. The Klan's tract in support of compulsory public education, The Old Cedar School, 
combined populism and bigotry to argue that elitists saw the public school as "not good 
enough" for their children while Catholics were more interested in learning religion than 
multiplication or democracy. Curiously, the Grand Dragon of the Oregon Klan sent his 
daughter to St. Mary's Academy, a Catholic school which became one of the plaintiffs in the 
Pierce case. WILFRED P. SCHOENBERG, S.J., A HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN 
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, 1743-1983, at 523 (Pastoral Press, 1987). 
41. David Horowitz, Klansman as Outsider, PAC. N.W. Q., Jan. 1989, at 12, 14-15. 
42. Ross, supra note 26, at 151-52. The Oregon Federation of Patriotic Societies, 
comprised of delegates from various fraternal organizations, including the Orange 
Lodges, Knights of Pythias, and Odd Fellows, well-connected, and active in public ser-
vice, particularly public school issues, became increasingly identified with the Klan and 
nativism. OREGON CATTLEMAN/GOVERNOR, CONGRESSMAN; MEMOIRS AND TIMES OF 
WALTER M. PIERCE 152-53 (Arthur H. Bone ed., Oregon Hist. Soc., 1981). 
43. Tyack, supra note 25, at 86-88. 
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ments, the opposition also claimed patriotism as its ally, de-
nouncing state monopoly of education as a form of totalitarian-
ism inconsistent with American values and parental authority. 
Governor Olcott led the assault on the bill, asserting the bill 
"aims to Russianize the State, since it deprives parents of their 
rights to educate their children as they see fit. "44 The Voter Pam-
phlet's arguments against the initiative repeatedly stressed two 
themes: the rights of parents to direct the education of their 
children, and the anti-Americanism of attempts to "standardize" 
children through state monopoly of education.45 One of the most 
popular slogans of the opposition read, "Who Owns Your Child? 
The State?"46 Opposition ads designated the initiative "the 
school monopoly bill" and called on voters to "[r]emember that 
Russia now has state monopoly of schools."47 Numerous pam-
phlets and leaflets focused their arguments on parental authority 
and democratic principles, with specific comparisons to Bolshe-
vik or Soviet educational Eractices.48 Local newspapers echoed 
this reasoning in editorials. 9 An editorial cartoon in the Portland 
44. Quoted in THE WASHINGTON POST, December 12,1922. 
45. The Evangelical Lutheran Synod argued for the "natural and inalienable" right 
of parents to provide children with a religious education. Another submission by private 
individuals compared the measure to Bolshevist Russia, where the child is a ward of the 
state. Other Voter Pamphlet submissions in opposition made the same points. OREGON 
SCHOOL CASES, THE COMPLETE RECORD, supra note 1, at 727-55 (reprinting Voter 
Pamphlet submissions). Additional arguments included the threat of tax increases and 
overcrowded public schools and the loss of economic and property rights. /d. 
46. The Catholic Civil Rights Association also sponsored an ad entitled "God Gave 
Parents Their Children." OREGONIAN, Oct. 29, 1922. For an argument that Meyer and 
Pierce constitutionalized a tradition of the child as the private property of the family, par-
ticularly the father, see Woodhouse, supra note 35. 
47. Ad sponsored by the Non-Sectarian and Protestant Schools Committee, 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 3, 1922. Other ads by the same committee appealed to "A Mother's 
Guiding Hand." OREGONIAN, Oct. 30, 1922. 
48. For example, one pamphlet, entitled "24 Reasons" made numerous connections 
between state educational monopoly and political tyranny. Reason 11, entitled "The 
proposed bill is inspired by the principles and practices of Russian Sovietism," quotes the 
Commissary for public instruction in Soviet Russia in 1920, who declared, "The private 
schools, those hotbeds for the cultivation of class distinction, were abolished or taken 
over by the State. That was one of our easier tasks." Over half a million copies of this 
pamphlet were distributed. Another pamphlet, entitled "Autocracy versus Parochial 
Schools," used "Bolsheviks" and "Socialists" as synonyms for traitors and tyrants. Vari-
ous pamphlets published by the National Catholic Welfare Council, including a Hand-
book for Speakers, argued that the bill would "Sovietize" education. HANDBOOK FOR 
SPEAKERS, CAMPAIGN FOR CATHOLIC EDUCATION 20 (1923). 
49. After denouncing the power of "invisible governments" from a secret society, 
the Daily Capital-Journal in Salem, Oregon, condemned state monopoly of education as 
"being given a full trial in Soviet Russia, where the child is treated as the ward of the 
State and the control of family abolished." PUBLIC OPINION AND THE OREGON SCHOOL 
LAW 5 (1923). The Portland Telegram also called the measure state monopoly of educa-
tion. /d. at 11. 
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Telegram showed gubernatorial candidate Pierce and Lenin em-
bracing a Klan figure who held a sign that read "State Monopoly 
of Schools Is An Absolute Success in Russia. "50 
Just prior to the election, a labor strike in Portland called by 
the Industrial Workers of the World, a well-publicized police 
round up of "Wobblies," and arson of a local high school raised 
fears of radical "foreign" agitation.51 These fears combined with 
anti-Catholic sentiments to bring out a large vote in favor of the 
school bill in the Portland area, a vote sufficient to gain passage 
in what was considered a political upset.52 The outcome in Ore-
gon was monitored across the nation, for although Oregon was 
the only state to pass a compulsory public education law, nu-
merous other states were considering such legislation.53 The na-
tional press denounced the Oregon law as autocratic and viola-
tive of parental, religious, and educational liberties. 54 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CASE 
The campaign against the initiative helped shape subsequent 
legal strategy. Representatives of the Catholic Church, the 
Knights of Columbus, and nonsectarian private schools jointly 
challenged the law in federal court. The National Catholic Wel-
fare Council, which supervised the litigation, pledged $100,000 to 
50. BONE, supra note 42, at 167. 
51. See !. W. W. Ordered to Invade City, OREGONIAN, Oct. 25, 1922, at 1; 225 Ar-
rested in Dock Strike, OREGONIAN, Oct. 19, 1922, at 1. 
52. Although the school bill lost in 21 of 36 counties, half of the majority for the bill 
registered from Multnomah County, Portland's home county. All Klan-endorsed legisla-
tive candidates from Multnomah County also won. The major newspapers in Oregon had 
predicted defeat for the compulsory public school bill. Tyack, supra note 25, at 91. Press 
in other parts of the country also had predicted defeat. The New York Times expressed 
"surprise" at the adoption of the law. What the Klan did in Oregon Elections, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1922, at E8. A sign posted at midnight on the chapel door of St. Mary's 
Academy in Portland said simply, "The School Bill passed. Fiat!" 
53. Ross, supra note 26, at 160; see N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1922, at 7. Archbishop Mi-
chael J. Curley claimed that the ultimate purpose was constitutional amendment. In a 
speech in Baltimore, Archbishop Curley charged "[t]he whole trend of such legislation is a 
state socialism, setting up an omnipotent state that will claim ownership of individuals, body 
and soul, on the principles of Carl Marx [sic] whose teachings have created Soviet Russia." 
54. The New York Times blasted the law for taking "from the parent all discretion" 
and making "the child a compulsory ward of the state." An Oregon Venture, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 12, 1922, at E6. The Omaha Evening World-Herald criticized the law for attempting 
to standardize children, and ultimately adults, asserting that "Despotism, enforced uni-
formity, whether imposed by a few or the many, is its own death warrant." PUBLIC 
OPINION AND THE OREGON SCHOOL LAW, supra note 49, at 7. The Virginian-Pilot in 
Norfolk called "[a] plague on all this intolerance masquerading as Americanism" /d. at 9. 
The Newark News commented that "The salvation of America lies in individualism, not 
in mass thinking" and questioned the "concept that the citizen is the theoretical chattel of 
the state." /d. at 10. 
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the legal challenge. The Knights of Columbus offered a minimum 
of $10,000.55 The Church selected the Society of the Sisters of the 
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, with several schools throughout 
Oregon, as plaintiff. Hill Military Academy, a nonsectarian 
school, also filed a complaint. The law was not due to go into ef-
fect until 1926 and there were concerns the court might find the 
suit premature. The choice of the federal forum was largely due to 
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Meyer v. Nebraska.56 
There was some disagreement as to whether parents, pupils, or 
teachers should be joined. Ultimately, the schools ended up argu-
ing both on behalf of their own interests and on behalf of the in-
terests of parents, a representation the court accepted. 57 
The complaints relied heavily on the schools' economic lib-
erty interests schools but also alleged a violation of the rights of 
parents to "direct and control the education of their own chil-
dren. "58 The complaint filed by the Sisters specifically alleged 
that the state had advised parents it would be "unpatriotic" to 
send their children to private school. 59 
At oral argument on a motion to dismiss, the attorney for the 
Sisters focused primarily on the economic liberty interests of the 
teachers and the private institutions. But the Sisters also argued 
that the law violated natural "inherent" liberty rights protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right of parents to con-
trol the education of their children and the right of children to re-
ceive an education in private school.60 The Sisters responded di-
rectly to accusations that private schools were unpatriotic, 
denouncing such claims as unfounded and deceptive.61 Conceding 
the state's legitimate authority to regulate all schools, the Sisters ar-
gued that the state exceeded its authority when it moved from regu-
lation to prohibition of private schools. Linking state monopoly of 
education to tyranny in what would become a recurring theme of 
55. See The Case of the Sisters of the Holy Names vs. The State of Oregon, on file in 
the archives of the Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary. 
56. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see infra text accompanying note 68. 
57. Ross, supra note 26, at 162. 
58. The complaints also alleged violation of the contracts clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, and deprivation of the children's right to acquire knowledge, and interference with 
religious liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. This latter claim was based on religious 
freedom as a "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment and did not directly argue for 
incorporation of the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth. Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), in which the Court first applied the First Amendment to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, was decided the week after Pierce. 
59. Plaintiff's Complaint, 1 XVII, 'I XVIII (b), supra note 1, at 26-28. 
60. THE OREGON SCHOOL FIGHT, supra note 30, at 82. 
61. !d. at 81. 
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the case, the Sisters charged that "[ t]here is no country of the world, 
save one, which undertakes to have a monopoly of education ... 
and that is soviet Russia."62 Hill Military Academy argued that the 
initiative was unreasonable since there was no evidence private 
schools failed either to educate or to produce good citizens.63 
The defendants sought to establish the patriotic necessity 
for the law. The attorney for Governor Pierce warned the law 
was intended "to meet one of our great national dangers ... the 
great danger overshadowing all others which confronts the 
American people . . . the danger of class hatred." He argued, 
"History will demonstrate ... that it is the rock upon which 
many a republic has been broken."64 The state described the 
school bill as a reasonable use of its legitimate authority to edu-
cate children and secure the assimilation necessary for national 
security. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to raise the parents' liberty interests 65 
Ten weeks later, on March 31, 1924, the district court de-
clared the law unconstitutional.66 The opinion relied primarily on 
economic liberties, chiefly the interest of the schools in maintain-
ing educational institutions, but also on the interest of the par-
ents in contracting with the schools to educate their children. 
Conceding the state's authority to require compulsory education, 
the court nonetheless found that the state presented insufficient 
evidence of harm caused by private schools to justify the inter-
ference with economic liberties. The court rejected the assimila-
tion justification as "an extravagance in simile" providing "no 
reasonable basis" for the law.67 In June, Oregon filed an appeal 
with the Supreme Court. 
II. THE CASE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
Pierce was not the first case that pressed the Supreme Court to 
consider the relationship between education and state authority. In 
June 1923, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska68 invalidated a Nebraska 
state law prohibiting instruction conducted in any foreign language 
62. !d. at 87.88. 
63. /d. at 98-103. 
64. /d. at 115. 
65. Id. at 117. 
66. Opinion of the United States District Court, March 31, 1924, reprinted in 
OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 41-54. 
67. /d. at 53-54. 
68. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
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in public or private grammar schools.69 English-only laws, products 
of nativism and World War I hostility toward immigrants, were 
aimed primarily at German instruction in private Lutheran schools. 
By the time Meyer reached the Court, 37 states had laws mandating 
English instruction.70 Not surprisingly, many of these laws were en-
acted in 1919, during the Red Scare, amid concerns that residents 
or citizens who could not speak English posed a national security 
threat.71 Nebraska defended the English language law as part of an 
assimilation program intended to "prevent children ... from being 
trained and educated in foreign languages and foreign ideals before 
they have had an opportunity to learn the English language and ob-
serve American ideals."72 Nebraska argued that "it is within the po-
lice power of the state to compel every resident ... to so educate his 
children that the sunshine of American ideals will permeate the life 
of the future citizens of this republic."73 The state insisted that "[a] 
father has no inalienable constitutional right to rear his children in 
physical, moral or intellectual gloom. "74 
Nebraska justified the law as a response to the threat to state 
security posed by foreign language instruction. Describing "isolated 
communities" where "foreign languages are used" as communities 
which are "under the control of foreign leaders," Nebraska warned 
that "these communities are growing up as little Germanys, little 
Italys and little Hungarys. "75 
This danger justified an infringement on the appellant's 
economic liberties because the legislature "should not be handi-
capped in its reasonable effort to prohibit a menace not only to 
the public welfare but to the safety of the state itself. "76 
69. The statute did allow foreign languages to be taught as a language course after 
eighth grade. 
70. See supra note 7. While most of these laws mandated English instruction, some 
specifically prohibited the teaching of German. See Brief of Defendant in Error at 24-29. 
Five challenges to these laws reached the Supreme Court, which rendered the opinion in 
Meyer and companion cases, Bartels v. Iowa, Bohning v. Ohio, Pohl v. Ohio, Nebraska 
Dist. of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 262 U.S. 404 (1923). 
71. William Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 
U. C!N. L. REV. 125, 133-34 (1988). The Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the law. 
72. Brief of Defendant in Error at 12-13, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
73. /d. at 15. 
74. !d. 
75. /d. at 13. The state's brief also quoted extensively from the opinion of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, which emphasized the need to "teach love for his country, and 
hatred of dtctatorshtp, whether by autocrats, by the proletariat, or by any man or class of 
men." !d. at 16. In the companion cases, Iowa and Ohio made similar arguments. See 
Ross, supra note 71, at 175-76. 
76. Brief of Defendant in Error, supra note 70, at 36. 
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Robert Meyer, a private school teacher, was convicted of 
teaching German during recess. Meyer argued that the state 
lacked evidence of security threats sufficient to justify a prohibi-
tion on instruction in foreign languages. He also claimed that the 
law interfered with economic liberties. While not disputing the 
state's interest in assimilation or in citizens proficient in English, 
Meyer charged that the state's methods violated the "spirit" of 
"liberty and toleration" which in other times has "prevented the 
efforts of tyrannical governments to suppress minority lan-
guages."77 Meyer contrasted American "toleration" with the op-
pressive suppression of linguistic diversity by the Germans and 
the Russians.78 Interestingly, Meyer's brief conceded the author-
ity of the state to require children to attend public school, a con-
cession which appellant repudiated at oral argument.79 
But the real tone for the Court's opinion in Meyer and the 
groundwork for Pierce were set by an amicus brief filed by Wil-
liam Guthrie on behalf of "various religious and educational insti-
tutions. "80 Guthrie, a prominent Catholic attorney and Columbia 
University law professor, was an influential advocate before the 
Supreme Court. He was a strong proponent of limited federal 
power over economic and property rights and is credited with in-
fluencing the Court's decisions in key economic liberties cases.81 
Guthrie was also chief counsel for the Society of Sisters in the 
Oregon school case.82 Strongly opposed to the Oregon law, which 
77. Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 16-17, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
78. /d. at 17. Appellants in the companion cases directly disputed any substantial 
connection between German immigrants and Bolshevik sympathies. Ross, supra note 71, 
at 166-67. 
79. Cf Brief of Plaintiff in Error at 14 with Oral Argument of Arthur F. Mullen, On 
Behalf of Plaintiffs-In-Error, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See infra text accompanying note 89. 
80. Brief of Amici Curiae, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
81. Historian Stephen B. Wood credits Guthrie with influencing the Court's deci-
sions in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down the federal child labor 
laws) and Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (child labor tax case). In fact 
Wood points out that the Court's decision in Bailey is excerpted straight from Guthrie's 
(losing) brief in McCray v. U.S., 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (Oleomargarine case). See STEPHEN 
WOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: CHILD LABOR AND 
THE LAW 280 (University of Chicago Press, 1968). In 1925, Guthrie was recommended 
to President Coolidge to fill the Supreme Court seat of Justice McKenna, who had just 
retired, but Coolidge decided that Guthrie was too old. 1 NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, 
ACROSS THE BUSY YEARS, RECOLLECTIONS AND REFLECTIONS BY NICHOLAS 
MURRAY BUTLER 357-58 (Scribner, 1939). 
82. While the Oregon school bill case was pending in the Federal District Court in 
Oregon in February 1924, Guthrie sent a letter to attorney J.P. Kavanaugh, who repre-
sented the Society of Sisters in the District Court, expressing his approval of Kavanaugh's 
presentation of the case. Letter from J.P. Kavanaugh to Society of Sisters, St. Mary's Acad-
emy, Portland, CHRONICLES (Fcb.ll, 1924). Guthrie appeared before the Supreme Court 
on behalf of the Society of Sisters. Thomas J. Shelley, The Oregon School Case and the Na-
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was passed only three months before the oral arguments in Meyer, 
Guthrie anticipated that the Meyer case could prejudice the 
Court's analysis in the Oregon case.83 Explicitly refusing to take a 
position on the outcome of Meyer, the amicus brief was intended 
to educate the Court on the Oregon case and focus the Court on 
the broader question of state monopoly of education relevant to 
both Meyer and Pierce.84 Labeling the Oregon act "revolution-
ary," Guthrie charged that it "adopt(ed] the favorite device of 
communistic Russia-the destruction of parental authority, the 
standardization of education ... and the mono~olization by the 
state of the training and teaching of the young." 5 The brief char-
acterized the Oregon law as un-American because state monopoly 
of education is "plainly repugnant to the spirit of Anglo-Saxon in-
dividualism," which has rejected the "notion of Plato that in a 
Utopia the state would be the sole repository of parental authority 
and duty."86 Ceding such power to the state destroyed the natural 
and constitutional rights of parents to raise and educate their chil-
dren" and was "(i]nseparable from the dogma of Sovietism."87 By 
joining the foreign language cases to the broader question of state 
monopoly of education, the brief challenged the Court to see 
Meyer not as a narrow example of state encouragement of assimi-
lation, but as part of a more comprehensive, and more troubling, 
assertion of total state authority over education. 
Guthrie's strategy succeeded. The Oregon case arose early in 
the oral arguments in Meyer. Justice McReynolds interrupted 
Meyer's attorney, Arthur F. Mullen, to ask: "What about the power 
of the State to require the children to attend the public schools? ... 
You will admit that, will you not?" When Mullen refused to agree, 
Justice McReynolds pressed him again: "You do not admit that?"88 
Mullen took the hint and proceeded to direct a large part of his ar-
gument to convincing the Court that the state lacks the power to 
tiona/ Catholic Welfare Conference, 75 CATH. HIST. REV., 439,445-47 (1989). 
83. Thomas O'Mara, an attorney advising the National Catholic Welfare Confer-
ence, recommended that the Conference file an amicus brief in Meyer. Guthrie quickly 
responded. Archives of the Catholic University of America. letter from Thomas O'Mara 
to Father James Hugh Ryan, March 5, 1923, cited in Shelley, supra note 82, at 450. Guth-
rie wrote, "there was danger that something might be said in the argument or decision of 
these cases which would prejudice the issue in Oregon." 
84. Amicus Brief, supra note 80, at 2. 
85. !d. at 3. 
86. !d. at 4. The brief also cited John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer as authorities 
condemning state monopoly of education. /d. 
87. !d. at 4-5. 
88. Transcript of Oral Argument of Arthur F. Mullen, 7, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 309 (1923). But cf Mullen's statement in his brief, supra, note 79. 
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"take complete control of education and give it a monopoly of edu-
cation."89 Mullen argued such power is "not in accordance with the 
history of our people" and cannot exist in a "constitutional gov-
ernment."90 He insisted that "it is one of the most important ques-
tions that has been presented for a generation; because it deals with 
the principle of the soviet. "91 Indeed, the oral argument focused 
primarily on the limits on governmental authority over education. 
Although Mullen argued that the language law violated numerous 
liberties, including religious and economic liberties, freedom of 
conscience, and the right of parental control over education, the 
Court was less interested in the nature of the liberty interest in-
fringed. Near the end of the argument, Chief Justice Taft reminded 
Mullen: "You know when we come to consider the question of the 
constitutionality of a law, we have, if we hold it invalid, to be able to 
put our fingers on the particular provision of the Constitution that 
is violated. Will you point out before you are through the particular 
provision which is violated?"92 
The Court's decision in Meyer attests to the influence of 
Guthrie's brief. In holding that the language laws unreasonably 
interfered with liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Court articulated a definition of liberty extend-
ing far beyond economic interests. Justice McReynolds's opinion, 
admitting that the Court "has not attempted to define with exact-
ness the liberty thus guaranteed,"93 proceeded to describe many 
aspects of that interest. "Without doubt," he wrote, "it denotes 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men."94 The Court concluded that 
"[c]orresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of 
the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in 
89. !d. at 9. 
90. !d. at 9-10. 
91. !d. at 10. 
92. !d. at 13. The Court had not yet incorporated any provisions of the Bill of 
Rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. There was some discussion at oral argument 
of whether the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause incorporated religious lib-
erty and free speech. Mullen also claimed that religious liberty was protected as a "privi-
lege and immunity" under the Fourteenth Amendment. !d. at 15. 
93. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
94. !d. 
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life."95 The Court held that the language laws impermissibly inter-
fered with the plaintiff's right to teach and the parents' right to 
engage foreign language instruction.96 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court considered the relationship between state power and 
education in language remarkably similar to Guthrie's brief. The 
Court explicitly recognized Guthrie's argument that Anglo-Saxon 
society had repudiated the Platonic ideal of state control of child 
rearing and education. Justice McReynolds's opinion, in a power-
ful rejection of state monopoly power over education, described 
Plato's Ideal Commonwealth as the prime example of "measures 
... approved by men of great genius" whose "ideas touching the 
relation between individual and state were wholly different from 
those upon which our institutions rest."97 Recognizing that "the 
state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the 
quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally," the Court 
nevertheless concluded that "a desirable end cannot be promoted 
by prohibited means."98 The Court's opinion sent a clear message 
to progressives that assimilation could not be accomplished by 
state monopoly power over education.99 
Justice Holmes, in a brief dissent joined by Justice Suther-
land, argued that the Court should have deferred to the legisla-
tive judgment because the language statutes were reasonable 
means of achieving the permissible goal of "a common tongue" 
among all citizens of the United States and therefore did not 
pose an "undue restriction" on economic liberty.100 
Guthrie's success in getting the Court to cast the Meyer 
opinion in the broader context of state monopolization of educa-
tion cemented the litigation strategy for Pierce. 101 Prior to the 
trial court hearing on Pierce in January 1924, Guthrie advised 
Oregon counsel: "In the first place, it is, of, course, important 
95. /d. at 400. 
96. /d. 
97. /d. at 402. 
98. !d. at 401. 
99. Ross, supra note 26, at 27-29. 
100. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices 
Holmes and Sutherland did join the Court in striking down an Ohio law prohibiting only 
the teaching of German. Bohning v. Ohio, 262 U.S 404 (1923). 
101. Just after passage of the Oregon law, and prior to the Meyer decision, Guthrie 
told a Catholic Church official that it is "indisputable" that the State may compel parents 
to send children to school and that the state may require schools to comply with educa-
tional standards. Guthrie argued that the strategy in challenging the Oregon law must be 
"imbued" with the "danger of attempting to urge extreme views limiting the power of the 
State over education." Letter from William D. Guthrie to Father John J. Burke (January 
5, 1923) (Catholic University Archives, Collection #10 NCWC-OSG, File Folder #7, Ore-
gon School Case 1922-1925). 
78 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Vol. 20:61 
that we should not seem to challenge the power of the State to 
make education compulsory and to prescribe that certain mini-
mum standards of instruction shall be complied with. "102 After 
quoting language from the Supreme Court's opinion in Meyer, 
Guthrie stressed, "It is the attempted monopolization of educa-
tion by the State that we now challenge, and this presents a 
novel proposition in our day and in this country ... but no gov-
ernment, however radical or revolutionary, has attempted to 
monopolize education except Soviet Russia. "103 
The relationship between state monopoly of education and 
democratic principles appeared as a central theme in the Pierce 
briefs. Both sides invoked the threat of communism. The brief 
for the Governor of Oregon argued that the law was within the 
permissible police power of the state as a means of "Americaniz-
ing its new immigrants and developing them into patriotic and 
law-abiding citizens. "104 It then asked the Court to consider "not 
only the classes of private schools now in existence but also the 
kinds of private schools which may be established in the fu-
ture."105 Reminding the Court that the "vast" majority of private 
schools are religiously affiliated, the brief argued: 
They may be followed, however, by those organized and controlled 
by believers in certain economic doctrines entirely destructive of the 
fundamentals of our government. 
Ifthe Oregon School Law is held to be unconstitutional it is not only 
a possibility but almost a certainty that within a few years the great 
centers of population in our country will be dotted with elementary 
schools which instead of being red on the outside will be red on the 
inside. 
Can it be contended that there is no way in which a state can prevent 
the entire education of a considerable portion of its future citizens 
being controlled and conducted by bolshevists, syndicalists and 
communists? 106 
The connection between religious intolerance and state mo-
nopoly of education surfaced when the state argued that manda-
102. Letter from William D. Guthrie to Judge J. P. Kavanaugh (January 2, 1924), 
(Catholic University Archives, Collection #10 NCWC-OSG, File Folder #8, Oregon 
School Case: January-June 1924). 
103. /d. (emphasis in original) 
104. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 102. Governor Pierce was represented by 
former senator and Oregon governor, George E. Chamberlain. 
105. /d. 
106. /d. at 102-03. 
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tory public education was justified to reduce the "religious suspi-
cions" caused by separating children "along religious lines dur-
ing the most susceptible years of their lives. "107 The Oregon law 
ensured that a "portion" of education could occur without "class 
or religious bias. "108 
Citing a number of cases upholding state authority to limit 
speech or other activities during war, the brief warned that the 
invalidation of the Oregon law would leave "nothing to prevent 
the establishment of private schools, the main purpose of which 
will be to teach disloyalty to the United States or at least the 
theory of the moral duty to refuse to aid the United States even 
in the case of a defensive war. "109 The state cautioned that "it is 
hard to assign any limits to the injurious effect, from the stand-
point of American patriotism, which may result."110 
The Governor's brief also warned that private religious 
schools presented a particular danger to the state because chil-
dren may be taught greater allegiance to their religion than to 
their country. This disparagement of the patriotism of religious 
schools provoked an angry response by the Sisters. Describing 
the assertion in the Governor's brief as "inexcusable and cruel 
... libel," the Sisters' brief explained that "patriotism, obedience 
to the law and loyalty to the Constitution are taught, not merely 
as a patriotic duty, but a religious duty as well, and the best and 
highest ideals of American patriotism and citizenship are ex-
alted."111 The state responded disingenuously by stating, "no 
charge against any religion is contained in that brief. "112 
Even though the First Amendment had not yet been ap-
plied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, other 
religious liberty arguments found their way into the briefs as the 
subtext of religious bigotry became overt. The Attorney General 
of Oregon, after claiming that religious liberty issues did not pre-
sent a federal question, argued that separation of church and 
state justified the law to prevent private schools from giving reli-
gious instruction to children while fulfilling the state's compul-
sory education requirements.113 This argument provoked a 
107. !d. at 97-98. 
108. !d. at 98. 
109. !d. at 115. 
110. !d. at 116 
111. Brief for Appellee Society of Sisters, supra note 2, at 239-42. 
112. Brief for Appellant Pierce, in. OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 130. 
113. Brief for Appellant Van Winkle, in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 
174-80. 
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lengthy response from the Sisters on the state's "frank" and "as-
tonishing" efforts to prohibit the free exercise of religionY4 Dur-
ing oral argument, Oregon's Assistant Attorney General, ap-
pearing on behalf of the Oregon Attorney General, denied that 
the law was an attack on religious liberty.us The state's denial 
proved ludicrous when the attorney representing the Governor 
of Oregon proceeded to describe the parental liberty argument 
as a sham because Catholic parents cede control over the educa-
tion of their children to the dictates of the Catholic church.u6 
The Governor's brief spent little time on parental rights. 
Despite recognizing that parents may have some liberty interest 
in the education of their children, the brief asserted that parental 
rights were subject to the "raramount" right of the state to exer-
cise control over minors. 11 The brief dismissed the broad lan-
guage in Meyer supporting the liberty interest of parents in the 
upbringing of their children with the notable comment that the 
"dicta in this case would appear to be somewhat broader than 
can be supported by the previous decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court."u8 According to the Governor's brief, no previ-
ous Supreme Court decision contained "any expression of opin-
ion that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the Federal courts 
any power to interfere between a state and its citizens relative to 
questions of religion, education or domestic relations including 
the question of the division of the power of control over children 
between their parents and the state. "u9 To neutralize Meyer, the 
state sought to link the Oregon law to Meyer's dictum accepting 
the "power of the state to compel attendance ... and to make 
reasonable regulations for all schools."120 The state argued that 
114. Brief for Appellee Society of Sisters, supra note 2, at 340-47. At oral argument, 
Guthrie argued that religious intolerance was the "true and real motive and intent of this 
measure." !d. at 653-54. 
115. Oral Argument of Appellant Van Winkle, in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra 
note 1, at 642. 
116. Oral Argument of Appellant Pierce, in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, 
at 683. 
117. Brief for Appellant Pierce, supra note 112, at 95; see also Brief for Appellant 
Van Winkle, supra note 113, at 157. Van Winkle's brief did admit the "inherent" right of 
parents to the custody and control of their children as one "recognized and protected in 
every civilized nation" but went on to argue that parental rights are subject to the 
"paramount" right of the state. !d. The state also argued regulation of education was 
solely within state authority and not subject to federal control. !d. at 104, 116. 
118. !d. at 100. 
119. !d. 
120. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402; see Brief for Appellant Pierce, supra note 
112, at 109-10; Brief for Appellant Van Winkle, supra note 113, at 158-67. 
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its legitimate authority over education prevailed over both eco-
nomic liberty and personal liberty interests. 
Guthrie's brief for the Sisters expanded on the themes of 
democracy and parental liberty developed in his amicus brief in 
Meyer. Taking care to recognize explicitly the state's legitimate 
authority to require compulsory education, the brief argued that 
mandatory public education crossed the line into totalitarian-
ism.121 It described the Oregon law as embodying the "pernicious 
policy of state monopoly of education. "122 Guthrie argued that 
"[e]xcept in Soviet Russia, there has been none in modern time 
so poor as to do that discarded doctrine of tyrants any rever-
ence. "123 Asserting that the "standardization of education" 
through "state monopolization ... has found well-nigh universal 
condemnation," the brief repeatedly associated state monopoly 
of education with tyranny. 12 While disputing that the state had 
provided any evidence that private schools teach "disloyalty and 
subversive radicalism or bolshevism," the Sisters argued that pa-
triotism could be ensured by licensing and regulating curricula. 125 
Regulation, not prohibition, was the lesson of Meyer. 126 The Sis-
ters' specific comparison of the Oregon law to Sovietism pro-
voked an angry response in the state's supplemental brief. Ore-
gon complained that "the cry of Bolshevism" had been overused 
by special interests to the detriment of the "great mass of people 
of this country [who will] lose their fear" of Bolshevism. 127 
The link between democratic principles and parental rights 
formed the core argument of Guthrie's brief. Claiming that "children 
121. Brief of Appellee Society of Sisters, supra note 1, at 238, 256. Guthrie made the same 
point at oral argument, stressing that the appellees did not challenge the authority of the state 
to enact a compulsory education law. OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 654. 
122. Brief of Appellee Society of Sisters, supra note 1, at 281. 
123. !d. Not surprisingly, the brief specifically asserted "there is no challenge what-
ever" on the state's power to enact compulsory education laws or reasonably regulate 
teacher qualifications or curriculum. !d. at 238. 
124. The brief quoted philosophers, legal scholars, historians and educators, includ-
ing John Stuart Mill, Chancellor Kent, and Herbert Spencer. For example, the brief 
quoted Mill: "A general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be 
exactly like one another; ... it establishes a despotism over the mind." !d. at 281-84. It 
also revisited Plato. !d. at 275. 
125. !d. at 258-59. 
126. !d. at 262. 
127. Supplemental brief, in OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 129. Appel-
lee's brief claimed that "until the Russian Soviet system came into being in Russia, de-
termmed to destroy personal liberty, parental control and religion, and until the statute 
... was enacted in Oregon, for pernicious and intolerant purposes perhaps better left un-
discussed in this court, it was doubtless true ... that the total absorption of the individual 
in the body politic and his entire subjection to the state was ... 'totally inadmissible."' 
Brief of Appellee Society of Sisters, supra note 1, at 282. 
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are, in the end, what men and women live for," Guthrie described 
parental rights as "the essence of liberty."128 Modem American soci-
ety recognized this liberty Guthrie contended because "[i]n this day 
and under our civilization, the child of man is his parent's child and 
not the state's."129 Describing Plato's "ideal commonwealth" as cre-
ating a "state-bred monster," the brief argued: 
It need, therefore, not excite our wonder that today no country 
holds parenthood in so slight esteem as did Plato or the Spartans-
except Soviet Russia. There children do belong to the state .... In 
final analysis, it is submitted, the enactment in suit is in conso-
nance only with the communistic and bolshevistic ideals now ob-
taining in Russia, and not with those of free government and 
American conceptions of liberty. 130 
By contrast, Guthrie argued, "children mean everything" to 
Americans "living under the blessings of free institutions and of 
the Constitution which guarantees them. "131 Such a culture, he 
wrote, would find it "natural" that parents should be "tenderly 
solicitous" about their children's education and "keenly zealous" 
of their own right to guide and control it.132 After quoting exten-
sively from cases broadly defining economic liberties under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Guthrie argued for a broad interpreta-
tion of parental rights because "the right to engage in a business, 
to teach, to acquire knowledge, to contract ... verily shrink into 
relative inconsequence" when compared to parental rights. 133 
Religious liberty arguments enhanced the appellees' appeal 
to democratic principles. The Sisters' brief referred repeatedlJ to 
the connection between religious tolerance and democracy. 13 At 
oral argument, Guthrie read a statement from Presbyterian min-
isters linking abolition of religious education with "the philoso-
128. /d.at274 
129. /d. at 275. 
130. /d. at 275. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. 
133. /d. at 279-80. 
134. E.g., id. at 240 ("there has never been a civilized nation without religion"); id. at 
241 ("the more democratic republics become ... the more do they need to live, not only 
by patriotism, but by reverence and self-control") (quoting Lord Bryce in The American 
Commonwealth); id. at 277 ("In our American theory, the state steps in, not to monopo-
lize education or attempt to cast all children in a common mold, or forcibly deprive them 
of all religious training and instruction.") (quoting Columbia University President But· 
ler); id. at 271 ("it is unreasonable and unjust in the extreme to suggest obliquely and by 
innuendo that the religious schools of the state, Catholic, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, 
Methodist, Lutheran, etc., do not inculcate reverence and righteousness and are to be 
classed as "red" or grouped with "bolshevists, syndicalists and communists"). 
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phy of autocracy that the child belongs primarily to the state. "135 
He argued that the purpose of preventing religious instruction 
paralleled "any atheistic or sovietic measure ever adopted in 
Russia. "136 By tying educational freedom to religious liberty, ap-
pellees directed the Court's attention to an issue "reachin~ to the 
very roots and spring of American constitutional liberty." 37 
The Court issued a unanimous decision on June 1, 1925. Jus-
tice McReynolds's brief opinion acknowledged the state's power 
to regulate education and schools.138 It also recognized that the 
law would effectively destroy private schools in Oregon.139 Citing 
Meyer, the Court concluded that the law "unreasonably inter-
feres with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the up-
bringing and education of their children."140 The Court's opinion 
gave little consideration to the content or scope of the parental 
rights upheld. It focused instead on the limits of state power. The 
Court's failure to articulate the scope of parental power is par-
ticularly interesting given the opinion's emphasis on the state's 
extensive authority to compel school attendance and regulate 
education.141 The Court explicitly declared state monopoly of 
education to be inconsistent with democratic principles: "The 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to stan-
dardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
public teachers only."142 Responding to the antitotalitarian 
135. OREGON SCHOOL CASES, supra note 1, at 668. 
136. /d. at 669. 
137. /d. at 665. The amicus curiae brief submitted by the American Jewish 
Committee focused heavily on the relationship between educational choice, religious 
liberty, and democracy, arguing that the legislation conferred "a monopoly of education" 
which will result "in precisely the same situation that now prevails in Russia." The brief 
explained that in Russia "it is strictly forbidden under severe penalties to impart religious 
instruction of any kind to children until they reach the age of eighteen years." /d. at 614. 
138. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534 (1925) 
139. /d. 
140. /d. 
141. "No question is raised concerning the power of the state reasonably to regulate 
all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require 
that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral 
character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizen-
ship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public 
welfare." /d. at 534. Felix Frankfurter described this dictum as one in which the Court 
"temptingly indicated to those bent on coercion how much room for mischief there is still 
left under the aegis of the Constitution." He further stressed that the Court left "ample 
room for the patrioteers to roll in their Trojan horses." Frankfurter's unsigned editorial 
appeared in the New Republic, June 17, 1925, reprimed in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE 
SUPREME COURT, EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION, 
177-78 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970). 
142. 268 U.S. at 535. 
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themes running through the briefs, the Court concluded: "The 
child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."143 The 
Court rejected state monopoly of education as inconsistent with 
parental rights and, ultimately, with democracy. 
III. EDUCATION, DEMOCRACY, AND PARENTAL 
RIGHTS 
The relationship between the state, parental authority, and 
education of children has absorbed the principal philosophers of 
Western civilization. Both Aristotle and Plato viewed education 
as essential to the survival of the state and envisioned a domi-
nant role for the state. 144 John Locke, by contrast, argued that 
parents have a duty to care for their offsprin~, including the duty 
and authority to control their education.1 5 John Stuart Mill 
maintained a role both for state and parents, contending that the 
state should require education but "leave to parents to obtain 
the education where and how they pleased. "146 Locke and Mill's 
recognition of parental interests squared with common law prin-
ciples of parental duty and control.147 
143. !d. 
144. Aristotle describes the factor "which most contributes to the permanence of 
constitutions is the adaptation of education to the form of government." ARISTOTLE, 
THE POLITICS AND THE CO:-ISTITUTION OF ATHENS 139 (Stephen Everson ed., Jonathan 
Barnes trans., 1996) (Book V 9). A distinguishing characteristic of tyranny is the suppres-
sion of education. !d. at 145-46 (Book V 11). Aristotle saw education as a responsibility 
of the state: "No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to 
the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution .... 
The character of democracy creates democracy." !d. at 195 (Book VIII 1). Unlike Plato, 
Aristotle accepted some role for the family in education. !d. at 31. Plato envisioned a 
state which assumes responsibility for raising and educating children from age ten "far 
away from those dispositions they now have from their parents." THE REPUBLIC OF 
PLATO 220 (541a) (Allan Bloom trans., 1968). The Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
Plato's model as undemocratic in Meyer. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
145. JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. VI, §58, at 306, § 69, at 
313 (1988). 
146. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, Ch. V, '112 '113 (1869) (available online at 
http://www.bartleby.com/130/S.html). For further analysis of educational philosophy, sec 
AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 19-41 (Princeton Univ. Press 1987). 
147. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47, 434 (1753). Parental duty and 
authority include maintenance, protection, and education. !d. at 434. Rousseau similarly 
described the father as the "true teacher." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE (Barbara 
Foxlcy trans., 1966). The Catholic Church also has articulated a divine, and "inalienable" 
mission and obligation of parents to educate their children. Pope Pius XI Encyclical, 
Rappresentanti In Terra, H 32-33 (Dec. 31, 1929). 
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The philosophy supporting compulsory education in this 
country relied heavill upon the significance of education to a 
successful republic.14 Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James 
Madison, and George Washington all stressed the importance of 
education to government. 149 An educated populace would safe-
guard both government and individual liberties. The association 
of the public good with education stimulated the passage of 
compulsory education laws.15° Federal land grants provided to 
new states for the establishment of public schools further linked 
federal and state policy to education.151 The connection between 
education and democracy became increasingly important in the 
second half of the nineteenth century as schools became the fo-
cal point for assimilation and "Americanization" of new immi-
grants.152 By 1900 more than thirty states and the District of Co-
lumbia had enacted compulsory attendance laws.153 
Cases challenging compulsory attendance laws as violating 
parental rights failed primarily because the courts recognized the 
importance of education not only to the child, but also to the 
state.154 These cases, while recognizing parental rights of care 
and control, held that the duty of parents to educate their chil-
dren is owed both to the children and to the state.155 
148. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 included the following clause: "Religion, mo-
rality and knowledge being necessary to good government ... schools and the means of 
education shall forever be encouraged." See also U.S. House Committee on Public 
Lands, Report on Educational Land Policy (1826) published in BARNARD'S AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 28, 939, 942, 944 (1878) ("The foundation of our political insti-
tutions ... rests in the will of the People .... How then is this will to be corrected, chas-
tened, subdued? By education-that education, the first rudiments which can be ac-
quired only in common schools."). 
149. See TYACK, supra note 6, at 23-24. Jefferson wrote that education is necessary 
to enlightened government. Washington, in his Farewell Address as President, advised: 
"In proportion as the structure of government gives force to public opinion, it is essential 
that public opinion should be enlightened." !d. Noah Webster argued, "[i]n our Ameri-
can republics, where government is in the hands of the people, knowledge should be uni-
versally diffused by means of public schools." /d. 
150. Massachusetts enacted the first statewide school law in 1789, requiring commu-
nities of certain populations to provide schooling. Massachusetts also enacted the first 
general compulsory attendance statute in the country in 1852. LAWRENCE KOTIN & 
WILLIAM F. AIKMAN, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPULSORY SCHOOL ATTENDANCE 
24-25 (Nat'! Univ. Public. 1980). 
151. After the Civil War, Congress required new states to establish nonsectarian 
public schools as a condition for admission to the Union. TYACK, supra note 6, at 29. 
152. Ross, supra note 26, at 12-13. 
153. KOTIN & AIKMAN, supra note 150, at 25. Reconstruction spurred the common 
school movement in the South. TYACK, supra note 6, at 133-36. 
154. See e.g., State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 732 (Ind. 1901); State v. O'Dell, 118 N.E. 
529 (Ind. 1918). 
. 155. Bailey, 61 N.E. at 732 ("One of the most important natural duties of the parent 
IS his obligatiOn to educate his child, and this duty he owes not to the child only, but to 
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The drive to use public schools to inculcate Americanism on 
impressionable young minds took on a heightened urgency with 
the advent of World War I. Schools became the focal point for 
teaching patriotism and the dangers of nonconformity.156 The 
country's preoccupation with nativism, patriotism, and ideologi-
cal conformity extended beyond the war, reaching its apex with 
the Red Scare of 1919-20.157 "Bolshevist" quickly became an epi-
thet, not only for radicalism, but also for difference, whether po-
litical, religious, or cultural.158 The crusade to purge America of 
Bolshevist influence spread through all facets of society. 159 Public 
education played a significant role in this crusade. States imple-
mented patriotic instruction in the schools through mandated 
courses, patriotic ceremonies, and regulation of the content of 
textbooks. 160 
Paradoxically, while many viewed public education as the 
bulwark against radicalism, the public schools' pursuit of knowl-
edge left them particularly vulnerable to claims of Bolshevik in-
fluence. Colleges were branded "hotbeds of bolshevism" and 
professors were accused of leading a "parlor pink seminary."161 
Public school teachers were suspended or dismissed for teaching 
the commonwealth."). 
156. TYACK supra note 6, at 155. 
157. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE, A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 
1919-1921, at 3-17 (Univ. of Minn. Press 1955) (describing how the fear of domestic Bol-
shevism resulted in the persecution of American communists and radicals). 
158. /d. at 166-69. One English journalist observed: "No one who was in the United 
States ... in the autumn of 1919, will forget the feverish condition of the public mind at 
that time. It was hag-ridden by the spectre of Bolshevism .... Property was in an agony 
of fear, and the horrid name 'Radical' covered the most innocent departure from conven-
tional thought with a suspicion of desperate purpose." /d. at 17. 
159. Politicians, clergy, labor leaders, farmers, factory workers, aliens, and civil 
libertarians were among those targeted. MURRAY, supra note 157, at 166-89. Even 
military officers were investigated for "Bolshevist views" such as criticizing the U.S. 
government. See, Link Capt. Hibben with Red Activity, Army Board Opens Inquiry into 
Fitness of Officer to Hold Reserve Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1924, at 16. The 
newspapers were filled with Bolshevist charges against individuals or groups. See, e.g., 
Brings Plea to Aid Northwest Farms; Governor Nestos of North Dakota Refutes Reports 
of Wave of Radicalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1923, at 8 (reporting that Governor Nestos 
denied that North Dakota and North Dakota farmers were "either radical or 
Bolshevist"); Reds Rely on Cash of 'Pink' Bolsheviki; Mine Union Expose Asserts 
Wealthy Liberals Here Kept Movement Going, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 15, 1923, at 20 (reporting 
that American "parlor" Bolsheviki funded U.S. communism); Tell of Bolshevist Drive; 
Rubin and Smith Warn Chicagoans of Propaganda, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1923, at 16 
(warning that Chicago was becoming a center of Bolshevism). 
160. For example, Oregon banned any textbook "that speaks slightingly of the foun-
ders of the republic, or of the men who preserved the union, or which belittles or under-
values their work." TYACK, supra note 6, at 169-70. This language was not removed from 
the statute until1985, ch. 388, §2, OREGON LAWS (1985). 
161. MURRAY, supra note 157, at 170. 
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about Bolshevism.162 Charges that Bolshevists had infiltrated the 
public school system appeared nationwide.163 In 1921, the Ameri-
can Bar Association warned that radical teachers were 
corrupting children by indoctrinating "~uestions into the un-
formed minds of the coming generation." 64 Numerous states in-
stituted loyalty oaths for teachers. 165 
The postwar Bolshevik hysteria posed, in stark relief, fun-
damental questions about democratic principles. Bolshevism re-
flected the antithesis of democracy, the antimatter to democ-
racy's matter. The "Bolshevist" label was not only an epithet for 
difference, it was code for all things considered antidemo-
cratic.166 But as the war years receded, increasing concerns sur-
faced that repressive and intolerant public responses to noncon-
formity were themselves tyrannical and thus undemocratic.167 
Political leaders who had proclaimed loyalty as the dominant 
characteristic of "Americanism" after the war now warned that 
an "intolerant spirit" was "the most ominous sign of [their] 
times."168 For example, in 1923, Charles Evans Hughes, Secre-
tary of State under President Harding, vigorously defined patri-
otism as "loyalty to the actual laws of the land" that does not al-
low efforts "to breed disrespect for law."169 By 1925, Hughes, as 
President of the American Bar Association, cautioned that 
" [ o ]ur institutions were not devised to bring about uniformity of 
opinion."170 Hughes stressed that "the essential characteristic of 
162. ld. at 170-73. 
163. In 1923, President Harding spoke at the opening session of the annual meeting 
of the Daughters of the American Revolution, where the president of the D.A.R claimed 
that 8,000 teachers across America preached disloyalty. Harding and Hughes Ask Patri-
otic Help at D.A.R. Convention, N.Y. TIMES, April17, 1923, at 1. Addresses on commu-
nism in the public schools were common. See, e.g., Ousted By A Woman At Anti-Red 
Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1924, at 7 (charging a "stream of radicalism which is flowing 
from Moscow to our public schools"). Patriotic societies such as the D.A.R and the 
American Legion were aggressive proponents of "100% Americanism." MURRAY, supra 
note 157, at 264-65. The resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan was in large part attributable to 
their campaign for" Americanism." !d. 
164. TY ACK, supra note 6, at 173. The Portland Oregonian charged that children 
were "the prey of theoretical propagandists in our institutes of education." MURRAY, 
supra note 157, at 172. 
165. MURRAY, supra note 157, at 270. 
166. See Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America's "First 
Freedom," 1909-1931,40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557,615 (1999). 
167. The rise of fascism in Italy provided a powerful example of how intolerance 
breeds repression. !d. at 616. 
168. Hughes Fears Laws Endanger Liberty, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 3, 1925, at 27. 
169. Harding and Hughes Ask Patriotic Help at D.A.R. Convention, supra note 163, at 6. 
. 170. Hughes Fears Laws Endanger Liberty, supra note 168. Hughes specifically men-
tioned the Oregon law as an example of an "obstruction" to education and "freedom of 
learning." ld. 
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true liberty is, that under its shelter many different types of life 
and character and opinion and belief can develop unmolested 
and unobstructed. "171 
Pierce thus arrived at the Court during a time of great na-
tional debate on the basic meaning of democracy. The Court had 
demonstrated that it was quite receptive to concerns that radical-
ism posed real dangers for democracy. In a series of cases up-
holding convictions under the Espionage Act against First 
Amendment challenges, the Court repeatedly held that teaching 
or advocating socialist or communist principles justified the con-
victions.172 In Gitlow v. New York, 173 decided just one week after 
Pierce, the Court upheld the conviction of a member of the So-
cialist Party for the preparation and distribution of publications 
describing socialist and communist principles and advocating 
revolutionary "mass action" against the government. 174 
That both sides of the Pierce dispute played the radicalism 
card attests to some disagreement within the Court, as within the 
country, on the proper response to perceived threats to democ-
racy. The wartime intolerance for expression of Bolshevist ideas, 
while still present in the 1920s, met a countervailing theory that 
free expression offered the best avenue for defusing radicalism 
in America.175 Justice Holmes's dissent in Gitlow, joined by Jus-
tice Brandeis, argued that suppression of radical speech by the 
government, absent immediate incitement, is inconsistent with 
democratic principles: "If in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their 
way."176 For Holmes and Brandeis, radicalism posed less of a 
171. /d.; see also Bobertz, supra note 166 (describing the postwar move from intoler-
ance to tolerance in matters of speech). 
172. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 
U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 
U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United States, 
252 u.s. 239 (1920). 
173. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
174. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow, the Court upheld the validity of a state statute 
prohibiting criminal anarchy or the advocacy of criminal anarchy, and "assumed" that 
freedom of speech is one of the liberties protected against state infringement by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. /d. at 666. The Court applied a highly deferential standard of 
review, concluding that the state's determination that utterances advocating overthrow of 
the government by violent means present a serious danger "must be given great weight" 
with "[e ]very presumption ... indulged in favor of the validity of the statute." /d. at 668. 
175. See Bobertz, supra note 166, at 610-14 (discussing free speech as a "safety 
valve" to reduce social unrest). 
176. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 632 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Abrams v. United States, 
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threat to democracy than the danger of tyranny from official 
suppression of speech.177 To the Pierce Court, the peril of insur-
gency through radicalism had to be weighed against the prospect 
of state monopoly of education, a system vigorously assailed as 
antidemocratic. The religious and ethnic bigotry infusing Pierce 
highlighted the relationship between intolerance and tyranny. In 
addition, the appellees' joinder of their attack on the state's edu-
cational monopoly with an appeal to traditional parental pre-
rogative resonated with a conservative Court suspicious of ex-
tensive regulation.178 The Court already had emphasized the 
connection between education and liberty in Meyer: "The 
American people have always regarded education and acquisi-
tion of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which 
should be diligently promoted. The Ordinance of 1787 declares, 
'Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good gov-
ernment and the happiness of mankind, schools and means of 
education shall forever be encouraged."179 In fact, prior to oral 
argument on Pierce, Chief Justice Taft told Guthrie that Meyer 
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("(T]he best test of truth is the power of 
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. ... That at any rate is 
the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."). 
177. The Court's hostility to economic regulation during this era can in part be at-
tributed to its perception that such legislation constituted social and economic engineer-
ing inconsistent with basic democratic principles. See Barry Friedman, The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1383 (2001); Michael J. Phillips, The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENY. U. 
L. REV. 453 (1998); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due 
Process Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363 (1990). 
178. For a full exploration of the perspectives of Chief Justice Taft and his conserva-
tism, see Carl McGowan, Perspectives on Taft's Tenure as Chief Justice and Their Special 
Relevance Today, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1143 (1987). "The new Chief Justice was conserva-
tive in his political and social views. Of major concern to Taft was the need to reduce the 
power that the national government had assumed during the First World War and in the 
adjustment to peace conditions." !d. at 1149-50. McGowan argues that "the Taft Court's 
hesitancy to tolerate the new social and economic legislation led to a period of extensive 
judicial activism toward state legislatures." /d. at 1153. McGowan describes Taft's view 
that "judicial review was the hallmark of the American system of free government" and 
"necessary to protect individual liberty." /d. at 1154; see also David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in The Supreme Court: 1921-1930, 1986 DUKE L.J. 65. 
179. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. Justice Brandeis included education as a fundamental 
interest, on the same level as speech. During consideration of Meyer, Brandeis advised 
Felix Frankfurter that the "right to your education and to utter speech is fundamental 
except clear and present danger." BRANDEIS ON DE~OCRACY 210 (Philippa Strum ed., 
1995). In 1915, Brandeis spoke on "True Americanism" in Boston on the Fourth of July 
and asserted, "Every citizen must have education, broad and continuous. This essential 
of citizenship is not met by an education which ends at the age of fourteen, or even at 
eighteen or twenty-two." /d. at 27. In an address in 1906 to the Civic Federation of New 
England, Brandeis addressed at length the critical importance of education, concluding 
that "(t]he educational standard required of a democracy is obviously high." /d. at 93. 
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controlled the disposition of Pierce. 180 Ultimately the pairing in 
Pierce of monopolistic state means and conformity enforcing 
state ends reinforced the law's antidemocratic attributes. The 
state's interest in fostering citizenship could not justify treating 
citizens as mere instrumentalities of the state. 
The Pierce decision met with widespread approval. Both the 
popular and academic press uniformly described the case as a 
triumph for tolerance and a defeat for state coercion.181 Shortly 
after the decision, Felix Frankfurter published an unsigned arti-
cle entitled "Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?" in 
which he described the Pierce decision: "Thus comes to an end 
the effort to regiment the mental life of Americans through co-
erced public school instruction. "182 The broad appreciation of the 
180. Prior to argument, Chief Justice Taft entered a room where Guthrie and co-
counsel Kavanaugh were waiting. When Guthrie requested additional time to present his 
argument, Taft responded, "I don't see why you want any more time. In principle this 
case is simply the Meyer case over again." Ross, supra note 26, at 171 (citing Correspon-
dence from John H. Burke to Thomas O'Mara, Mar. 25, 1925, Archives of the United 
States Catholic Conference). 
181. The New York Times described the case as holding that "the inherent right of a 
parent to send his boy or girl to any school he deems best was upheld and the right of a 
state to insist that the children must attend certain institutions was sharply denied." N.Y. 
TI~1ES, June 2, 1925, at 1. According to the New York Times editorial describing the stat-
ute as "born of prejudice,'' the case held that "the guarantees of religious freedom and 
individual liberty are violated when the attempt is made to say exactly how and where 
children shall be educated." N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1925, at 22. The Portland Oregonian 
declared that Eastern newspapers were "unanimous" in commending the decision. See 
Eastern Press Commends Oregon School Decision, OREGONIAN, June 4, 1925. The arti-
cle quoted numerous newspapers, including The Philadelphia Public Ledger ("Few su-
preme court decisions in years have been more important. ... The decision upholds a 
cherished right. It is sound in Americanism and common sense .... Standardized educa-
tion has been defeated"); The New York Herald Tribune ("The ... decision is one of 
great importance ... since it clarifies the problem of state control over education ... 
maintaining ... that the state may not monopolize education"); The Baltimore Sun 
("Any other decision would have been revolutionary. No other decision could have been 
rendered without dealing a deadly blow to the principles on which our government is 
based, adding a final nail to the coffin of freedom which fanatical tyranny has been fash-
ioning since the close of the world war"). The academic commentators varied in describ-
ing the nature of the interest protected but agreed in endorsing the soundness of the limi-
tation on state power. See e.g., Oregon School Law Invalid, 9 CONST. REV. 150 (1925) 
(parental and religious liberty); J.P. Chamberlain, The Legislature and the Schools, 11 
A.B.A.J. 492 (1925) (parental liberty); Charles Warren, The New 'Liberty' Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 455 (1925-1926) (parental rights and 
property rights); Note, State Control of Education, 74 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 78 (1925) (pa-
rental rights and limitation on state ability to prohibit rather than regulate); Notes, Con-
stitutional Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 146 (1925-1926) (property rights). 
182. Frankfurter's description of the decision as "just cause for rejoicing," is particu-
larly significant in so far as the article attacked the Supreme Court's "control of legisla-
tion" and called on the states to protect liberalism. FRANKFURTER, supra note 141 at 
174-75. 
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Court's recognition of liberty interests over loyalty concerns sig-
nified the shift in the national mood from suspicion to tolerance. 
IV. PIERCE AS PRECEDENT 
Given the timing of Pierce, it might not have endured as 
precedent. The demise of Lochner and the economic liberties 
cases in the 1930s could easily have discredited Pierce. In the al-
ternative, Pierce might have been subsumed into the speech and 
religion cases that incorporated the First Amendment into the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.183 Neither 
scenario occurred. More than 144 Supreme Court cases have 
cited Pierce as authority.184 
Pierce appears as a constitutional chameleon from the 
1920's through the 1960's. The description of the constitutional 
right protected by Pierce varies considerably. In addition to pa-
rental rights, the case is cited in supEort of economic liberty,185 
free speech/86 and religious liberty.1 The perception of Pierce 
as a religious liberty case is particularly prevalent. Cases in this 
vein blend religious liberty with parental liberty. For example, 
Prince v Commonwealth of Massachusetts 188 cited Pierce as 
precedent supporting both religious liberty ("The rights of chil-
dren to exercise their religion, and of parents to give them reli-
183. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise). Cit/ow was decided only one week after Pierce. 
184. See generally Richard Seid, 75 Years After Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 78 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REv. 373 (2001) (listing and discussing cases). 
185. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 527 (1926); Village of Euclid v. Am-
berly Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926), Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 281 
(1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
186. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The 
right of free speech, the right to teach ... are of course fundamental rights"); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969) ("It can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate"); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 
U.S. 586, 599 (1940) ("[T]he Bill of Rights bars a state from compelling all children to 
attend the public schools"). 
187. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) ("The rights of children to 
exercise their religion. and of parents to give them religious training, ... have had recog-
nition here"); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S 1, 18 (1947) ("This Court has said that 
parents may ... send their children to a religious rather than a public school."); see also 
id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge relied extensively upon Pierce as a 
religious liberty case, reasoning that "education which includes religious training and 
teaching ... have been made matters of private rights by the very terms of the First 
Amendment." He concluded: "It was on this basis ... that this Court held parents enti-
tled to send their children to private, religious schools." /d. at 51; accord Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319,324 (1937). 
188. 321 U.S. 158 (1944 ). 
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gious training ... have had recognition here.") and parental lib-
erty ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents. "). 189 Similarly, in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 190 the Court stated, "It is clear that such an intrusion by a 
State into family decisions in the area of religious training would 
give rise to grave questions of religious freedom comparable to 
those raised here and those presented in Pierce . ... "191 Yoder ac-
cepted Pierce's recognition of parental control in the upbringin~ 
of their children established by Pierce as "beyond debate. "1 
The Court concluded: "However read, the Court's holding in 
Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the re-
ligious upbringing of their children. "193 Although the Court dis-
tinguished parental interests from free exercise rights, it none-
theless characterized Pierce as a religious liberty case decided on 
parental rights grounds primarily because the Court had not yet 
incorporated the free exercise clause into the Fourteenth 
Amendment.194 
The most thorough discussions of Pierce occur in Prince and 
Yoder. In both of those cases, the analysis of the scope of paren-
tal rights resounds with ambiguity. While careful to characterize 
parental rights as "fundamental," the Court emphasized with 
equal clarity the power of the state to regulate in ways that may 
conflict with parental interests.195 This ambiguity arises directly 
from the failure of Pierce to address the tension between paren-
tal rights and legitimate state control over children. 
The resurgence of substantive due process analysis in the 
1960s refocused the Court on parental interests as a matter of 
personal and family privacy.19 The importance of Pierce as a 
189. !d. at 165-66. 
190. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
191. /d.at231-32. 
192. !d. at 232. 
193. !d. at 233. 
194. /d.; see also School District of Abington Township v Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 312 
(1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("It has become accepted that the decision in Pierce ... 
was ultimately based upon the recognition of the validity of the free exercise claim in-
volved in that situation."). 
195. In Prince, the Court said that "the state as parens patriae may restrict the par-
ents' control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, 
and in many other ways." 321 U.S. at 166. In Yoder, the Court stated: "There is no doubt 
as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to im-
pose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education." 406 U.S. at 
213. Both cases cite Pierce for these limitations on parental rights. 
196. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) ("[T)he Meyer and 
Pierce decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 152-53 (1973) ("this guarantee of personal privacy 
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foundational case for the right of privacy is perhaps best de-
scribed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman: 197 
[Liberty] ... is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, in-
cludes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and 
purposeless restraints. . . . Thus, for instance, . . . in that case 
[Meyer] and in Pierce, ... I do not think it was wrong to put those 
decisions on "the right of the individual to ... establish a home 
and bring up children" ... or on the basis that "The fundamental 
theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the State to standardize its chil-
dren .... I consider this so, even though today those decisions 
would probably have gone by reference to the concepts of freedom 
of expression and conscience ... derived from the specific guaran-
tees of the First Amendment. ... For it is the purposes of those 
guarantees and not their text, the reasons for their statement by the 
Framers and not the statement itself ... which have led to their 
present status in the compendious notion of "liberty" embraced in 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 198 
Justice Harlan interpreted the "purposes" and "reasons" of 
the textual guarantees to include "a most fundamental awect of 
'liberty,' the privacy of the home in its most basic sense":1 
Certainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely 
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its pre-
eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is 
something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its pro-
tection the principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitu-
tional right. ... This same principle is expressed in the Pierce and 
Meyer cases .... These decisions ... have resgected the private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter. 00 
The connection between Pierce and privacy is further illu-
minated by Pierce's focus on the democratically compelled limits 
on state power over individual lives. The privacy cases explore 
the outer limits of government authority over intimate personal 
and family decisions.201 They share with Pierce a preoccupation 
... has some extension to activities relating to ... child rearing and education"); FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 (1978) ("Yoder and Pierce hold that parents, not the 
government, have the right to make certain decisions regarding the upbringing of their 
children"). 
197. 367 u.s. 497 (1961). 
198. !d. at 543-44. 
199. !d. at 548. 
200. !d. at 551-52. 
201. See e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law 
prohibiting the use of contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a 
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with draconian governmental control over significant personal 
choices.202 The antitotalitarian concerns of the privacy cases gen-
erally lead to an analysis which, like Pierce, eschews substantial 
consideration of the scope of the right in question in favor of fo-
cusing on the government's use of impermissible means. 
After two decades in which Pierce appeared primarily in 
string citations, Troxel v. Granville203 finally focused attention on 
the parental rights protected by Pierce. Troxel held that a Wash-
ington statute permitting broad judicial discretion to override 
parental decisions concerning third-party visitation, as applied to 
a claim by paternal grandparents, violated a mother's due proc-
ess right to control her children's upbringing. The 6-3 decision 
generated six opinions, including the plurality opinion by Justice 
O'Connor. Though splintered, the Court showed considerable 
consensus on the recognition of parental rights. Eight Justices 
recognized a constitutionally protected right of parents to con-
trol their children's upbringing.204 At the same time, none of 
these eight Justices was willing to give significant weight to pa-
rental rights; all eight recognized the authority of the state to in-
trude on parental rights in appropriate situations.205 In addition, 
five out of the six opinions, includin£ the plurality opinion, did 
not articulate a standard of review. 06 Most significantly, even 
while recognizing a parental right, the various opinions admit 
that the right is ill-defined and show no interest in articulating its 
"metes and bounds. "207 
state law prohibiting abortion except to save the life of the woman); Moore v. City of 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (invalidating a city ordinance prohibiting extended 
family members from living together). 
202. See Rubenfeld, supra note 18. 
203. 530 u.s. 57 (2000). 
204. Only Justice Scalia disputed the existence of a constitutional right, although 
Justice Thomas upheld the right primarily on the basis of stare decisis. /d. at 80, 91-93. 
The dissents by Justices Kennedy and Stevens explicitly accepted the legitimacy of paren-
tal rights. /d. at 81-96. 
205. Both Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion and Justice Souter's concurrence ex-
pressed concern with the Washington law because it did not require some consideration of 
parental interests. Neither suggested parental interests would always be deemed para-
mount. /d. at 69 (O'Connor, J.); /d. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's dissent 
said that "we have never held that the parent's liberty interest in this relationship is so in-
flexible as to establish a rigid constitutional shield." /d. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
206. The plurality spoke only in conclusory terms of "unconstitutional infringe-
ment." /d. at 72. Justice Thomas, concluding that stare decisis supported fundamental 
parental rights, applied strict scrutiny. /d. at 80. 
207. "Our cases, it is true, have not set out exact metes and bounds to the protected 
interest of a parent." /d. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring). "We do not, and need not, define 
today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context." /d. at 
73 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
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Justice Stevens affirmatively rejected Justice Thomas's sug-
gestion that Pierce resolved the case because, unlike Pierce, 
Troxel did "not present a bipolar struggle between the parents 
and the State over who has final authority to determine what is 
in a child's best interests."208 Justice Stevens's comment clarifies 
some of the analytical disarray in Troxel. Pierce provides little 
guidance for a case like Troxel, in which the legitimacy of some 
level of governmental regulation of visitation is accepted and the 
Court is faced with the difficult task of sorting out relative de-
grees of authority among multiple parties. Because Pierce is fun-
damentally grounded in antitotalitarian principles, it offers little 
insight into the more complex analysis of defining the scope of 
parental rights in the context of permissible state means. 
The Pierce Court was deeply absorbed with defining the 
limits of state power in a constitutional democracy; it was less 
concerned with the scope and meaning of parental rights. The 
endurance of parental rights in constitutional doctrine owes 
more to the profound respect for these interests throughout our 
legal and cultural history than to explicit constitutional analysis. 
In that regard Pierce offers only the most skeletal analytical 
frame for parental rights. Rather, its richness rests in the Court's 
eloquent description of the threat posed by monopolistic state 
means and conformity-enforcing state ends to democratic prin-
ciples of tolerance and pluralism. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The brevity of the Pierce decision belied the complexity of 
the principles at stake. The Oregon initiative presented in stark 
relief the question of whether the state's interest in fostering citi-
zenship justified state monopoly of education. This question's 
profound implications for democracy were colored by a national 
obsession with the perceived evils of communism. With its strong 
language rejecting state authority to "standardize" children, 
Pierce treated the controversy as one directly pitting democracy 
against totalitarianism. The nativism and religious bigotry under-
lying the Oregon law provided the subtext for this pitched politi-
cal struggle. In holding the law unconstitutional, the Court sent a 
208. !d. at 86 (J. Stevens, dissenting).Justice Stevens also argued that while Pierce "is a 
source of broad language about the scope of parents' due process rights ... the constitu-
tional principles and interests involved in the schooling context do not necessarily have par-
allel implications in this family visitation context, in which multiple overlapping and com-
peting prerogatives of various plausibly interested parties are at stake." !d. at 86 n.7. 
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strong message that tolerance is a fundamental constitutional 
value. Pierce's protection of parental rights was incidental to the 
decision's primary concern: whether state monopoly of educa-
tion is permissible in a democracy. Although Pierce serves le-
gitimately as a point of origin for the constitutional protection of 
parental rights, it tells us far more about the fundamental attrib-
utes of democracy. 
